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Abstract: This paper compares some findings relating to organised crime in Europe as presented by 
international agencies with findings obtained by national independent researchers in a number of 
countries. The comparison will help highlight the dilemmas, the controversies and the vexed questions 
that still adumbrate our understanding of organised crime, while it will pave the way for a tentative 
classification that can clarify, at least partially, the contours of the subject matter.
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CRIMINAL HUBS AND ACTIVITIES
In the analysis of Europol (2011a), based on law 
enforcement information from across the EU, 
there are five criminal hubs in Europe:
• north-west, with the centre of gravity in the 
Netherlands and Belgium;
• north-east, with the centre of gravity in 
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Russia;
• south-east, with the centre of gravity in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Greece;
• south, with the centre of gravity in southern 
Italy;
• south-west, with the centre of gravity in 
Spain and Portugal.
These hubs are deemed concentrations of illegal 
logistics which facilitate flows of illicit goods and 
in which criminal groups operate thanks to their 
proximity to destination markets, commercial and 
transport infrastructures and major migratory 
routes. Observing such illegal concentrations, 
there is a sense that organised crime is growing 
increasingly diverse in its methods, structures 
and impact on society. ‘A new criminal landscape 
is emerging, marked increasingly by highly 
mobile and flexible groups operating in multiple 
jurisdictions and criminal sectors, and aided, 
in particular, by widespread, illicit use of the 
internet’ (Europol, 2011a, p. 5). Criminal groups 
are also said to expand their activities, with 
some becoming distinctively poly-commodity 
in their operations and with the most successful 
developing diverse portfolios of criminal 
business interests (UNODC, 2010). Strong levels 
of cooperation are detected between different 
organised groups, transcending national, ethnic 
and business differences. This ‘collaborative 
atmosphere’ is attested by the common practice 
of barter, whereby illicit goods are exchanged 
rather than bought and sold, while transactions, 
it is assumed, tend to jettison the use of cash. 
A connected tendency is the intensified use of 
transport infrastructures, with criminal groups 
taking full advantage of global movements of 
commodities and the growing mobility of people. 
With the economic crisis, it is felt that organised 
criminal groups will have new opportunities to 
recruit disadvantaged individuals, who may find 
in illicit occupations a ready-made substitute for 
legitimate work. Finally, some thought is devoted 
to the role played by ‘specialists’, namely 
legitimate actors who are willing to cooperate 
with organised criminal groups and facilitate 
their activities in some way.
This general picture is accompanied by a 
detailed examination of the different sectors of 
illegal activities, with drug distribution, as one 
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would expect, regarded as paramount. Poly-
drug trafficking appears to be increasing, as 
it ensures greater resilience to fluctuations in 
supply and demand while maximising profits 
(EMCDDA, 2010). Meanwhile, although the 
majority of heroin entering Europe comes from 
Afghanistan via Turkey and the Balkans, the 
proliferation of direct transport and commercial 
links between producing and distributing 
countries has contributed to diversification in 
route and trafficking methods. Hence the recent 
development of the Black Sea route, which 
connects Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine 
to Romania and the Baltic countries. The Balkan 
route itself shows unprecedented flexibility, as 
heroin consignments transit through Greece 
before reaching Bulgaria and Romania and 
thus Central Europe. The Kosovo region is the 
operating base of ethnic Albanians involved 
in trafficking into central and western Europe. 
In the north-west hub, Turkish groups are said 
to be active, along with Dutch and Moroccan 
organisations, whereas in the north-east hub 
Lithuanian groups service the growing heroin 
market of Russia.
‘Transportation of heroin is often paid for 
with the commodity itself, creating local 
markets in countries of trafficking routes. 
Because heroin commands a higher price in 
destination markets and large distribution 
centres, the smaller amounts distributed en 
route are often highly adulterated’ (Europol, 
2011a, p. 9).
Spain and Portugal remain the main European 
entry points for cocaine, which is also imported 
into the continent, through west Africa, by 
Moroccan groups who utilise the north African 
route established for cannabis. A prominent 
role in the organisation of cocaine trafficking, 
however, is now taken by west African criminal 
groups, who hold direct connections with South 
American producers. Such connections have also 
been established by groups operating in south-
east Europe and in the Balkans.
Synthetic drugs offer organised criminal groups 
the advantage that production may be very 
close to consumer markets, thus offering a 
highly cost-effective activity. Ecstasy is mainly 
produced in the Netherlands and Belgium, but 
tends to be replaced by ‘designer drugs’ and 
‘legal highs’ such as methylone, mephedrone, 
fluoramphetamine and others (EMCDDA, 2010). 
Synthetic drugs are in high demand in countries 
where cocaine prices are high, hence the 
expansion of producing groups, for example, in 
Poland and the Baltic states. Cannabis and khat 
distribution complete the information provided 
by Europol, which singles out west African, 
Albanian and Lithuanian criminal organisations 
as the major poly-drug groups.
Illegal immigration is another important area for 
organised crime activity, which responds and 
adapts to changing law enforcement strategies. 
Some groups may limit their role to the provision 
of forged travel documents, while others may 
offer transport services. Yet others may direct 
illegal migrants to employers or employ them 
themselves once they have reached the country 
of destination. Official reports tend to overlook 
the instances in which illegal migrants require a 
mere service helping them move across borders, 
and focus mainly on the victimisation aspect of 
this illicit business. For example:
‘Traffickers recruit their victims mostly in 
deprived, disadvantaged or poorly integrated 
sectors of society, offering them employment 
abroad. Many victims are lured with bogus 
offers of legitimate employment. Others 
agree on the type of work they are expected 
to perform, but are deceived by the actual 
circumstances they find on arrival in the 
destination country’ (Europol, 2011b, p. 10).
The most powerful criminal groups are 
identified as those capable of controlling the 
entire trafficking process, from recruitment to 
transportation, from the provision of forged 
documents to illegal or criminal employment. 
The most frequently reported groups involved 
in human trafficking are, in descending order, 
Roma, Nigerian, Romanian, Albanian, Russian, 
Chinese, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish 
organised crime groups. Migration flows from 
north Africa and the Middle East are said to 
provide criminal groups operating in Europe with 
opportunities for exploitation, while trafficking is 
also linked to the commission of welfare benefit 
fraud, which implies large profits and low levels 
of perceived risk of detection. Finally, the use of 
the internet is associated with the transnational 
marketing of sex workers.
VAT fraud is a highly lucrative offence, accounting 
for an estimated EUR  5  billion in damage 
to European taxpayers each year (European 
Commission, 2010). Due to the nature of VAT 
fraud, which allows numerous traders to exploit 
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the system without affecting each other’s profits, 
organised groups are unlikely to compete in 
this illicit activity; rather, they most often tend 
to cooperate by exchanging information and 
techniques. Credit card frauds in Europe are 
also attributed to organised crime groups, who 
‘collect data from payment cards by means 
of attacks on online payment systems, data 
breaching and skimming (magnetic strip copying 
and PIN capture)’ (Europol, 2011a, p. 23).
An attractive alternative to drug trafficking 
is cigarette smuggling, with organised crime 
choosing destination countries among those 
with high taxes on tobacco, such as Scandinavian 
countries, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Spain. In turn, an alternative to the smuggling 
of genuine cigarettes is the manufacture of 
counterfeits, whereby fake versions of well-
known brands are illegally produced and 
marketed. Poland and some Baltic countries are 
singled out as significant sources of counterfeit 
cigarettes. For instance:
‘In Poland, a highly specialised and organised 
crime group has been involved in the illegal 
production of cigarettes supplying the 
German black market. Cooperation between 
Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Polish criminals has 
been a key feature in this case: companies 
in Ukraine delivered the tobacco, other 
ingredients passed through the Lithuanian 
port of Klaipeda, while production took place 
in Poland’ (Europol, 2011a, p. 25).
The euro is yet another target of organised 
crime (European Central Bank, 2011). Groups 
engaged in the counterfeiting of this currency 
are characterised by rigid organisational 
structures and high degrees of division of labour. 
Participants include investors, printers and 
distributors, while Italy and Bulgaria are deemed 
the foremost countries of the activity. Chinese 
organised groups, meanwhile, are credited 
with performing a major role in commodity 
counterfeiting, with goods entering the EU 
via all major seaports before being distributed 
throughout the continent. Counterfeit medicines 
are included among such goods.
Other areas covered by official reports relate to 
weapons trafficking and environmental crime. 
The former, it is stressed, takes place through 
the same routes that are used for drug and 
human trafficking, and consists mainly of small 
or second-hand firearms. The latter implies the 
dumping of hazardous substances and involves 
mafia-type structures with sufficient resources to 
manage the disposal of large-scale waste.
Finally, money laundering constitutes a crucial 
area of investigation, where organised crime 
continues to use traditional, established methods 
such as cash couriers, while availing itself of 
diverse types of shell companies. Moreover:
‘The availability of many new laundering 
possibilities offered by modern technology 
has provided transnational groups with new 
ways to further their criminal interests. In some 
Member States, investigations into suspected 
money laundering activities continue to be 
hampered by the requirement for a predicate 
offence’ (Europol, 2011a, p. 32).
A preference for offshore banking locations is 
noted, and organised criminal groups are also 
seen as skilled users of new technologies and 
of services (insufficiently regulated) offered by 
digital currency operators such as WebMoney 
and Liberty Reserve.
In conclusion of this section, it is worth identifying 
some of the most significant points addressed 
so far. First, official descriptions of organised 
crime in Europe posit that cooperation among 
groups is an established fact. Second, that the 
collaboration of some official experts is, at times, 
required for some organised criminal activities to 
be performed. For example, the production of 
synthetic drugs is said to involve specialists in the 
fields of organic synthesis and retail pharmacy. 
Third, that the main activities in which organised 
criminals engage are, typically, conventional 
illegal activities servicing black markets. Let us 
now compare these descriptions with the findings 
of other research studies, mainly conducted on a 
national level, which are presented below in the 
form of rough sketches.
INDEPENDENT NATIONAL 
RESEARCH
Research conducted by independent teams and 
individuals emphasise the role of networks rather 
than that of organisations. This research forces 
analysts to observe in detail how associations are 
formed, how plural the nature of the social is, and 
how mutable connections between individuals 
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and groups present themselves. As Latour (2005, 
p. 247) has proposed, the social emerges when 
the ties in which one is entangled begin to 
unravel: ‘the social is further detected through 
the surprising movements from one association 
to the next’. If we apply this perspective to the 
analysis of organised crime, we are demanded 
to ‘follow the actors’ and observe the modalities 
they use to create associations (Rankin, 2011). 
Networks emerge within specific contexts, which 
determine their nature, the form of aggregations 
and the multiple affiliations that are likely to be 
forged.
Official sources indicate that collaboration 
among different organised groups is increasingly 
likely and, implicitly, that alliances make tasks 
viable on the transnational scene. There is 
some truth in this, although qualifications are 
required when facing specific national contexts. 
In the Netherlands, for example, the situation 
is characterised by the co-presence of distinct 
groups, which may cooperate, although mainly 
within a precise division of roles (Siegel, 2010). 
Such groups, in fact, are unlikely to form organic, 
long-term partnerships, let alone establish 
collegial, intra-ethnic memberships. Ethnicity is 
also a key variable in Greece, although ad hoc 
partnerships may be influential in some criminal 
activities (Antonopoulos, 2012). In France and 
Italy, on the other hand, indigenous criminal 
groups may act as gatekeepers, allowing access 
to illicit markets to non-nationals only at pre-
established financial costs. In both countries, 
however, newcomers may also operate in illicit 
market sectors dismissed by upwardly mobile 
local groups (Lalam, 2012; Ruggiero, 2012). 
In Italy, moreover, rather than partners, the 
newcomers may well provide ‘criminal labour’ 
to locally established criminal networks. Mixed 
ethnic groups may be taking shape in Spain 
(Gomes-Céspedes, 2012), but are extremely rare 
in Russia (Rawlinson, 2012), while in the United 
Kingdom what is vividly manifest is a situation of 
competition and succession among ethnicities, 
rather than their amalgamation.
In brief, independent research describes an 
extremely nuanced situation, with fluid, multiple 
dynamics guiding the ways in which groups 
create associations and affiliations. The emphasis 
placed on criminal transnationalism is at the origin 
of the hurried generalisations found in official 
documents, where it is taken as a given that 
criminal groups move across national boundaries 
with the purpose of establishing illicit colonies 
abroad. Hence, presumably, the urge for such 
groups to form close consortia across borders. 
On the contrary, it has been noted that criminal 
organisations are mainly stationary, because it is 
at the local level that they provide their services 
and goods while accessing resources (Varese, 
2011). It should be added that the way in which 
groups and individuals assemble is determined by 
the conditions governing illicit markets, as well as 
by the relationships between these markets and 
the legitimate ones. In this sense, transnational 
criminal activity may be successful where the 
formal–informal interface is remarkably large 
and the boundaries between legitimate and 
illegitimate are already substantially blurred. In 
such contexts, alliances and multiethnic criminal 
membership between groups find a favourable 
environment, like legitimate corporations find in 
deregulation the opportunities to pursue their 
multinational interests.
As for the ‘collaboration of experts’ mentioned by 
official agencies, this is not limited to the cases of 
drug production highlighted above. Observing 
the sketches provided above, it would appear 
that in some European countries (Spain, Greece, 
Italy, Russia) organised crime does not merely 
seek the scientific expertise of official actors, but 
attempts, and often manages, to ‘assemble’ with 
political and economic operators who occupy the 
legitimate domain. Entire sets of power groups 
are targeted, including entrepreneurs, local and 
national political representatives, the police and 
the judiciary, with a view to forging with these 
sectors more or less stable, illegal, partnerships 
(Gounev and Ruggiero, 2012).
This leads to a final consideration around official 
accounts. These appear to focus primarily on 
conventional criminal activities, thus neglecting 
the overlaps and joint initiatives that organised 
criminals undertake with members of the white 
collar community. In this sense, official concerns 
are mainly directed towards ‘pariah’ forms of 
criminal enterprise, namely those whose options 
in markets are limited. These enterprises are 
in need of the goods and services, including 
protection that more powerful criminal 
enterprises can deliver. On the other hand, they 
are incapable of accessing the official economy 
to a significant degree. More powerful variants 
of organised crime, which expand their activities 
into the licit arena of business, both maintain 
their characteristics of organised crime and adopt 
those typifying corporate actors. They are offered 
the opportunity to engage in value-adding 
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partnerships with legitimate entrepreneurs, 
in mutual economic promotion and through 
the exchange of services. Criminal groups who 
do not ‘make it’ into the legitimate arena are 
denied those ‘multiple social affiliations’ that 
would improve their chances. The way in which 
they assemble socially will confine them to the 
underworld.
In some countries we are faced with networks 
of professionals whose long-term apprenticeship 
has produced the skills, the rationalisations 
and, crucially, the reputation allowing them 
to operate in a variety of illicit markets. In 
other countries we witness successful forms 
of organised crime reaching out to the official 
world. The different power wielded by organised 
crime in specific national contexts reminds us of 
an ironic observation made by Landesco (1973) 
with respect to the Chicago criminal scene. In 
the Chicago of the 1920s, success was measured 
at funerals of mobsters: if when you are alive 
you can hide the identity of your friends, you 
can hardly do so when you are dead. Those 
funerals revealed the connections of organised 
crime with the institutions: mourners included 
businessmen, lawyers, politicians and a sprinkling 
of police officers. On the other hand, countries 
that do not display such ‘assemblages’ may not 
be paragons of honesty; rather, they may possess 
an elite whose inaccessibility makes it reluctant 
to share its illegality with outsiders.
In conclusion, research into organised crime 
may avail itself of new directions emerging 
from the cases examined above. The consortia 
involving conventional and white collar criminals 
demand a slight alteration of Sutherland’s 
(1983) theory, which implies that techniques 
and rationalisations are learned within specific 
homogeneous enclaves or professional groups. 
In some European countries, on the contrary, 
learning processes appear to cross the boundaries 
of social groups, as criminal know-how is 
transmitted to a variety of actors. In other words, 
techniques are exchanged and skills enhanced 
within an economic arena inhabited by legal, 
semi-legal and illegal businesses. Law enforcers 
may also want to pursue these new investigative 
directions.
I would like to list a number of predicates that 
describe the consortia, partnerships and joint 
activities discussed above. These predicates 
indicate a ‘method’ rather than an organisation, 
and are termed here ‘mafia method’ (Ruggiero, 
2011).
A MAFIA METHOD
This method is composed, first, of a culture of 
the fittest: in human and social evolution it is 
more important to win than to win by the rules.
• The law has to aid the survival of the fittest.
• Politics and markets are guided by natural 
selection: business and the law will always 
reflect the relative strength of the competing 
forces in a society.
• Our choices in politics and markets are not 
the result of individual decisions but of social 
relations.
• Social relations determine what is fair and 
what is not.
• Legality is fluid, liquid, and loyalties and 
commitments are contingent.
• The state has to adapt to economic behaviour, 
not the other way around.
• Private initiative cannot be restrained.
• We are the state: by acting in markets, we 
implicitly delimit the ambit in which the 
authority is entitled to intervene.
• Society is formed of a series of hubs of 
influence and interest, and a stable social 
order works so that all hubs are satisfied.
• Norm violation is a habit that creates its own 
normative order.
• The resources we already hold prove that we 
are able to accumulate them and turn them 
into general well-being.
• Deviating from norms has always been the 
engine of innovation.
• Action is always situated and some situations 
force individuals to violate the law.
• What is just and what is legal are two different 
things.
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• Ethical standards are forged through physical, 
social and ideological bonds, which provide 
rationalisations for action and justifications 
for their outcome.
• Some core groups in society are entitled to 
choose which norms should prevail because 
they lead other groups towards progress.
• The law must be agile and cannot be defined 
as a separate world delimited by its own 
principles.
• The agility of the law should make it sensitive 
to acts performed in spheres external to it: 
politics, economics, everyday life.
• Our practices are tolerated, therefore they are 
widespread and lend themselves to imitation.
• The disadvantaged also benefit from our acts.
• The resources we appropriate gain greater 
value once we possess them.
• The cost of prosecuting us is higher than the 
gains we acquire.
It seems to me that this is a very dense agenda 
for future research.
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